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 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act shook the corporate world beyond US borders 
more than Enron shook the corporate world within them.  This Article goes 
beyond the prodigious commentary on the Act itself to understand the nature of its 
reception outside the US.   
 
 It first develops a hubs-and-spokes account of global corporate life in 
which corporate purpose, which varies around the world, forms the hub and 
radiates spokes constituting governance, finance, accounting, and auditing—all 
of which also differ around the world.  Using this model, the Article suggests that 
non-US receptions to the Act exhibited unfounded fear that the exportation of US 
norms concerning the spokes of corporate life could redefine corporate 
conceptions of the hub, corporate purpose.  It also shows the fallacy in the no-
scandal-here argument emanating from countries around the world. 
 
 Although global reactions to the Act may therefore have been somewhat 
overstated, the Act certainly carried a whiff of exporting US corporate norms 
around the world by fiat.  A key lesson for the US is the next time US corporate 
scandals erupt and Congress adopts a legislative response, it should 
automatically exempt non-US issuers pending SEC determinations of the 
necessity of applying the reforms to them. 
 
 A related implication of this model and interpretation concerns debate 
over whether corporate life around the world is converging to a single model or 
remaining path dependent and varied.  Moves like SOX seem to change the 
character of both the debate and the direction of evolving corporate life.  The 
normative payoff contends that the superior road to harmonious corporate life is 
in developing comity rather than hoping for convergence. 
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 United States capital market regulation amid globalization addresses the world. Ten 
percent of SEC registrants are non-US issuers, commanding market capitalizations constituting 
nearly 20% of the US total.  Sixty countries are represented directly, home to 1400 non-US 
companies operating in every nook of the globe, triple the number of a decade ago.1  When US 
regulation enters the internal governance of SEC registrants, as the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 does (non-affectionately known abroad as SOX),2 US capital market regulation is no longer 
purely domestic policy but assumes an international relations dimension.   
 
 This subtly profound point was missed by US lawmakers who rushed SOX into the 
global business landscape in July 2002 as a response to a series of US corporate debacles.3  
Political blindness to the international relations viewpoint was evident from the US failure to 
consult regulatory counterparts abroad and from the heated political rhetoric accompanying 
SOX, which trumpeted the legislation as the most sweeping reform of American business 
practices since the 1930s.4  When adopted, SOX made no distinction between US issuers and 
non-US issuers, though in the year following enactment the SEC adopted numerous exemptions 
for the latter. 
 
 By US standards, SOX is essentially a codification of existing rules and practices, fitting 
easily if awkwardly into the US corporate template.5  For many non-US issuers, the fit is alien, 
superfluous or conflicting. Though many SOX provisions could be adapted to fit non-US issuers, 
the entire character of SOX is American.  It is legislation appearing to export US corporate 
norms by fiat.  If it worked, this would alter the shape of corporate life in other countries.  This 
may or may not be desirable from the viewpoint of any given country or the world at large, but 
attempting the export without the courtesy of consultation exhibits an unbecoming arrogance that 
caused substantial ruckus in the global corporate community. 
 
 SOX marks the first US Congressional foray into corporate regulation since globalization 
transformed the world during the 1990s.  It also marks the first time that regulation has reached 
inside the internal affairs of SEC registrants.  These unprecedented moves occur at a time when 
enormous pressures have led towards significant harmonization of global corporate life, but 
where substantial resistance to change endures.  SOX’s adoption without foreign consultation 
threatened to upset the somewhat delicate balance of the process towards harmonization. 
 
 The potential disruption arises without regard to which of two rival schools of thought on 
comparative corporate philosophy one holds.  One school announces the inevitability of market-
oriented structures based on the US model.  All other models are converging toward this ideal, 
according to this stance.  The competing view sees greater path dependence in the way of this 
evolution, with the consequences of historical choices derailing such convergence.   
 
 Both theories explain important aspects of the contemporary global corporate condition.  
Chosen paths throw obstacles on the track towards free market liberalism while that model 
remains the only one with both proven success and promise.  But viewing SOX as an exercise of 
formal exportation of US corporate norms, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, alters this debate’s 
character.  It matters less whether models left to their own operation would move in this 
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direction or resist it; SOX injects an exogenous factor into the process, whatever course it would 
follow without it.  In fact, the international ruckus arising from SOX is noisier than its substance 
warrants, suggesting US corporate regulation of non-US issuers risks altering the course of 
convergence by provoking backlash.  
 
 With SOX as its first legislative venture into corporate regulation in the globalized world, 
the US Congress and President failed to appreciate the new international relations dimension of 
US corporate regulation amid globalization.  But SOX’s relative modesty furnishes a relatively 
cheap lesson for the future, a lesson the SEC was taught in the year following SOX as it provided 
exemptions in response to vociferous lobbying objections of countries and companies around the 
world.6  In the future when Congress regulates US capital markets and SEC registrants, it should 
not punt to the SEC to hedge the resulting international relations fall-out but address that thicket 
up-front. 
 
 This Article has five Parts.  Part I reviews the global reach of US securities regulation.  
Part II canvases comparative corporate life, showing varying conceptions of corporate purpose in 
the world’s major economies and how these radiate different tools of finance, governance, 
accounting, and auditing.  Part III considers the static accompanying global reception of SOX.  
Its point is that global complaints against SOX have less to do with formal conflict and are more 
concerned with the deeper level of threats it carried to redefine basic conceptions of corporate 
purpose around the world.  Part IV reinforces this understanding by showing as imprecise the 
common criticism that while SOX was necessary to fix American problems, other countries did 
not share the problems or need the fix.  Other countries have problems of corporate malfeasance 
too, though they constitute deviations from different norms, suggesting that SOX-type provisions 
are not unnecessary elsewhere, though different versions of them may be better suited to 
addressing subtly different sorts of deviations.   
 
 The final Part draws a further normative point, that whatever direction global corporate 
life is taking—convergence or sustained divergence—measures such as SOX when adopted 
without consultation can disrupt the process of harmonization.  A prescriptive point follows: the 
next time the US Congress adopts corporate regulations addressed to domestic corporate power 
abuse, it should automatically stay application of the law as to non-US issuers until and unless 
the SEC determines that such application is necessary and appropriate for the protection of US 
investors and US markets.   If this were done with SOX, the world would have arrived at the 
same place, without undesirable political agitation, anxiety, and backlash risks.  This underscores 
the international relations aspect of US corporate regulation amid globalization. 
 
I.  SOX’s Clumsy Global Reach 
 
 SOX is global.  It applies to any issuer of securities registered with the SEC, as well as 
any auditor wherever located attesting to the financial statements of such issuers.  The heavy 
rhetoric accompanying SOX echoed world wide, recognized as bearing substantial significance.  
The global sobriquet “SOX” suggests a perceived whiff of noxiousness abroad.7 
 
 Of the some 14,000 SEC registrants, approximately 1,400 are non-US entities, 
representing some 60 countries.  About 240 registrants come from the “vital” global economies 
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of the UK, Japan, France and Germany.8  These aggregate US$2.4 trillion in market 
capitalization.  Another 160 represent other European countries, including a handful from 
Eastern Europe.9  About 60 non-Japanese Asian companies are SEC registrants, including 
companies from China, India and Russia.10  Nearly 200 SEC registrants hale from Canada, 
another 200 from Latin America,11 90 others from Israel, and a dozen more from elsewhere in 
the Middle East and Africa.12 
 
 These figures all represent historic peaks and enormous feats.  The vast majority of SEC 
non-US issuers arose during the 1990s, including all those from South America and non-
Japanese Asia.   In 1991, no registrants haled from any Eastern European countries, China or 
Russia; nor were Germany, France or Switzerland represented. Also in 1991, there were only 19 
UK companies, 8 Japanese companies and 5 Dutch companies listed on US exchanges.13 
 
 The substantial international scope of US capital markets epitomizes globalization.14  The 
reach of US capital market regulation requires attention to its global effects.  Pre-SOX practice 
gave pre-enactment exemption to non-US issuers and their auditors from rules relating to 
corporate governance.  SOX makes no such provisions and the SEC work toward doing so 
followed several quarters after enactment as a response to intense foreign lobbying.15 
 
 US corporate regulation may be aimed predominately at US capital markets and to that 
extent constitutes domestic policy.  But since a large and growing segment of those addressed are 
non-US entities and their internal regulatory apparatuses, it trips into international relations.  
SOX stamps US norms on non-US entities.  The stamp produces significant international 
reactions, implicating matters of international relations.    
 
 Apart from the UK, European nations cast a more collectivist orientation than the 
individualist attitude prevalent in the US.  Their embrace of markets, while significant, is more 
modest than that of the US or the UK.  High levels of taxation and a more substantial 
commitment to state-supplied social safety-nets distinguish European custom from Anglo-
American practice.  The character of the competition between Europe and the US, with the UK 
continuing its dualist role, is influenced by these varying philosophical commitments to 
collectivist versus individualist solutions to economic and social challenges.  European 
inclination towards the purer-market US corporate model hinges on the smoothness of the 
process of moving from collectivist to individualist orientations. 
 
 Unresolved historical tensions between Asian nations, geographical expansiveness and 
political flux combine to render elusive contemporary analysis of comparative corporate 
governance and financial reporting encompassing Asia (other than of the vital and ascendant 
components such as Japan and Korea).16  The sheer diversity of these countries, the substantial 
multi-ethnicity of many (especially China, India, Indonesia and Russia), and the complexities of 
corporate character make Asian relations with the US and absorption of US models far more 
complicated than in Europe.  Even greater sensitivity is required to address local concerns, and 
the stakes of failure higher given regional volatilities.  
 
 Globalization, trade, and corporatism have benefited Latin America, spawning a political 
and economic vitalization on par with the concurrent transformation of Eastern Europe and the 
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erstwhile Soviet Union.17  Inflation is controlled, democratic institutions are strengthening, and 
no military build-ups are in progress.   Improvements remain necessary in critical areas such as 
education, property rights, and non-bribable judges. 
 
 The downside is also acute: the gap between rich and poor is so wide that Latin America 
consists of two-tiered societies in which the elite minority is integrated internationally and the 
vast populace is insulated.18  Asset ownership is moving toward multinational corporations, 
threatening to create public perception of eroding national sovereignty that could provoke 
backlashes against globalization and the US.19  Nurturing corporate life while spreading its 
bounties are both critical to avoiding such a result.  The right corporate norms for contemporary 
Latin America as it struggles with these challenges may not be the same as those prevalent in the 
US and embodied in SOX.   
 
 Almost every corner of the world, even the most unlikely, participates in globalization. 
But the US is both the driving force and the prime beneficiary.  Global economic growth in the 
1990s was propelled by economic interdependence through global capital markets.  One effect of 
global market rule is to curtail the nation-state’s power to control local economic destiny.20  One 
risk of that is an internal vacuum that places greater strain on the state’s exercise of political 
power amid economic paralysis.   
 
 For Europe this risks over-reliance on collectivist solutions; for Latin America it risks 
revolts of those left out of globalization’s bounties and authoritarian political temptations for 
their leaders; for Asia, it risks both of these coupled with the threat of fundamentalist uprisings 
and nuclear militancy; for Africa, it risks criminal and terrorist exploitation of that continent’s 
vulnerabilities as a money- laundering and terrorist training safe haven. 
 
 Free market globalization remains the most promising and only proven route to economic 
prosperity and human freedom.  As the lone beacon, this reinforces the power and allure of the 
market model, particularly of the US variety.  Countries and companies seeking capital must 
prepare to participate in the markets, meaning globalization. Joining the process puts more 
wealth in the hands of investors, reinforcing the globalization circle.  Reinforcement of the circle 
too rapidly increases the risks of backlash geometrically with every repetition.21 
 
 Managing these risks requires cautious exercise of the instruments of globalization.  This 
means acting in ways that sustain the possibility of important measures of local power capable of 
addressing market failures in democratic and peaceful ways.  SOX-like imposition of US norms 
on local companies threatens that capability for those supervising local markets.  Markets work 
wonders and they also fail.   They should be allowed to do both, but societies reaping gains from 
the wonders—led by the US—should be cautious when reaching into the internal corporate 
affairs of local companies since that reach hazards unintended consequences.   
 
 Globalization can continue to promote and spread prosperity only if its benefits are seen 
as available to all.  A distinctive feature of the US system is precisely that those in the bottom 
and middle of the economic pecking order overwhelmingly believe that someday they or at least 
their children may well be in the top.  Making such opportunities available elsewhere is not as 
easy as remaking the world in the US’s image, or remaking multinational corporations in the 
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image of corporate America.22   The US market system and corporate America required decades 
to mature and remain far from perfect. 
 
 Leading copycats are groping towards the model, imperfectly.  China is soaring 
economically but getting nowhere democratically.  Russia remains mostly non-market and non-
democratic despite a decade of struggle and billions of aid.  In long-nurtured and richly-
developed Japan a decades-long bout of recession lingers.  Even in longstanding liberal, market-
oriented democracies across Europe, economic and political challenges endure that sustain 
collectivist tendencies.   In this world, SOX and other impositions of US norms by legislative 
command are dangerous—even in those countries best able to adapt and comply.   
 
II.   The Hubs and Spokes of Global Corporate Life 
 
 National conceptions of corporate purpose differ around the world.  Alternative 
conceptions of corporate purpose include maximizing profits, promoting business survival, 
promoting the state, maximizing size and power, or even providing employment.  The 
corporations in vital countries may be seen to pursue a combination of these goals.  Varying 
significantly is the emphasis on one or the other as the guiding mission, the one pursued when 
trade-offs must be made.23 
 
 Despite differences in conceptions of corporate purpose, some of the tools employed to 
measure, monitor, and assess achievement of purpose appear similar across the globe.  Others are 
converging.  A nation’s conception of corporate purpose influences the choice of tools it uses in 
corporate governance and how these tools are described.  A broad issue of comparative 
governance is whether changes in the tools of corporate life—such as financing sources—are 
powerful enough to influence changes in the specification of corporate purpose—such as 
shareholder wealth maximization or creditor protection. 
 
A.  The Landscape    
 
 In the US and UK (as well as in Australia, Canada, and Israel), the guiding corporate goal 
is to make profits. Pressure to put the interests of other constituencies ahead of shareholders 
invariably achieves marginal success.  The only clear winners have been employees amid hostile 
takeover efforts, and often incumbent management.  Disputation is best conceptualized 
according to how to split up the pie, not so much to assure its growth, survival, or nationalistic 
identity.  Resulting rules and norms emphasize shareholders as owners and mostly contain 
provisions designed to promote the corporate mission of enhancing their claims measured by net 
operating profits.  Provisions of SOX are squarely in this conception. 
 
 In Germany (and to a lesser but meaningful degree such countries as Austria and 
Switzerland), survival and business continuity are the key goals.   The corporation is seen as a 
multi-constituted engine absorbing centrifugal resources and spinning off payouts in all 
directions.  That engine must hum, continually.  There is a sense of the famously engineering 
culture in this, of longevity, endurance, performance over the longest possible time horizon.24 
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 In France corporate goals are more nationalistic.  French corporate culture reflects a 
deeply-forged industrial policy possessing the peculiar characteristics of French capitalism, a 
socialistically-oriented philosophy.  In it the ultimate mission of aggregating resources and 
distributing goods and services is a consciously organized joint effort of the state and private 
institutions.25  Motifs of the model include a high degree of state equity ownership and control; 
an elite cadre of technocrats that migrates easily between governmental and industrial service.26 
 
 The state-industry identity appears as a force in Japan but there is yoked for the distinctly 
different joint purpose of enlarging corporate power and market share.27   A steady flow of 
managers moves from governmental posts to industry and sometimes the other way.28  The ends 
of this stream are not to build Japanese industrial policy but to enable the governmental engines 
to aid particular corporations and their groups.  A common conception of the Japanese 
corporation sees it as a family, with all members playing special roles that gain protection within 
the governance structure, and for whose ultimate power and size all family members are 
expected and feel constrained to work.29 
 
 These alternative conceptions of corporate purpose endure among all vital countries, 
including alternatives among members of the European Union and of the Union itself, despite 
three decades of harmonization efforts in Europe and more than a decade of harmonization 
pressure wrought by globalization.  This suggests that redefining these goals by fiat, particularly 
by a foreign power, is not only doomed to fail but could backfire by reinforcing national or 
regional commitment to existing local conceptions. 
 
 This reality is reinforced by the variety of tools that radiate from these different purposes.  
The finance characteristics of these countries vary.  Some rely more heavily on equity financing 
through public capital markets, as in the US and UK.  Others rely more heavily on debt financing 
provided by banks, as in Germany and Japan.  Others show a mixture, as in France. 
 
 Differences in corporate purpose and finance tools influence governance tools. Managers 
of US and UK corporations are overseen by a board of directors consisting of a mix of inside and 
independent directors and are headed by a CEO characteristically wielding significant and often 
dominant power within the corporation.  A complex system of legal and market checks and 
balances imposes discipline on the CEO, management and board to advance the mission of 
delivering profits for shareholders.    
 
 Germanic corporate governance (as well as Dutch) differs most conspicuously by its two-
tiered board structure, a supervisory board comprised of multiple constituent groups and an 
underlying management operational board.  Internal checks do most of the disciplining work, 
less market- or law-based, to advance the key mission of business continuity and survival.  More 
participants sit at the table.  On the supervisory board sit representatives of creditors, employees, 
managers, and shareholders.  The process and structure of corporate governance is more 
concentrated compared to the diffusion of participants in the US/UK model.30 
 
 Although French corporate governance offers such features as dual boards, French 
corporate governance in practice resembles US corporate governance.31 Both produce senior 
executive officers possessing substantial power, a somewhat weak but potentially omnipresent 
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board of directors, and shareholders, employees, and other constituents nominally furnished a 
variety of protections substantially through process-oriented principles such as director 
independence, disclosure, and the like.  Labor exerts substantial influence in French power 
centers, including at corporations, both through unions and in work councils. 
 
 As in the US, statutes empower Japanese boards of directors to manage the corporation.  
Unlike the US, they actually exercise this power rather than delegating it to officers.  In fact, the 
concept of officers as it is known in the US is unknown in Japan, for all those who would be 
considered officers (or senior management) in the US are on the Japanese board.  The board, in 
turn, is split into a series of ranking hierarchies, as well as into numerous committees.  The use 
of committees arises as a practical necessity from the large average size of Japanese boards.32 
 
 Corporate purposes, and the finance-governance-spokes attendant to them, drive different 
accounting rules relating to individual companies and to corporate groups.  Particular differences 
drive enormous bottom line differences.  Numerous studies indicate that the identical business 
performance would be measured differently in terms of profits in various European countries.  
For example, the same exact series of hypothetical business transactions produces profits of 89 in 
Germany, 100 in France, and 129 in the UK. 33 
 
 These accounting figures bear an intuitive relationship to corporate purposes.  Of the 
group, the country most devoted to profit maximization is the UK and, lo-and-behold, its 
accounting produces highest reported profits.  Of the group, Germany exhibits the greatest 
interest in survival not growth, a goal consistent with relatively lower reported profits.  France is 
in between, reflecting a country most given to sovereignty promotion rather than profit or 
survival alone.   
 
 The US is akin to the UK, and far different from Germany or France.34  Japan is more 
akin to both of the latter: in each case accounting is law and the chief objective is to comply with 
legal requirements often driven by tax and fiscal requirements, not necessarily to depict financial 
performance and condition.35  These differences in country accounting persist despite global 
efforts since the 1970s to produce an agreed set of international accounting standards. 
 
 A similar fragmentation besets auditing.  In all vital countries, the audit is the ultimate 
bonding and intersection of corporate finance, corporate governance, and accounting, under-
girded and reflected in the practice and purposes of the audit.  All require auditor independence. 
Beyond the audit requirement and a shared broad general mandate for it, differing are all the 
other elements of corporate life:  the hub of corporate purpose and the spokes of finance sources, 
management structure, and accounting measurements. 
 
B.  Enter SOX 
 
 It was into this diverse global corporate landscape that SOX entered.  The central 
implication illustrated by the hub-and-spoke structure of comparative corporate systems is that 
the assembly is intertwined.36  A particular hub accompanies a set of suitable spokes.  Hub 
purposes and finance structures are linked; they drive governance structures; the combination 
dictates disparate accounting conventions.  All elements of the system are tested and evaluated in 
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an audit, directly in the case of accounting and indirectly in the other areas.  SOX aims at the 
spokes in ways that could easily be taken as threats to the hubs, a perception that explains much 
of the static in the world’s reception to SOX. 
 
Without cataloging all of SOX’s provisions, several illustrations make the point.37  SOX 
establishes an audit oversight board that duplicates regulatory boards in other vital countries;38 it 
compels auditor independence by specifically restricting a specified list of activities resembling 
but not matching those restricted in other vital countries.39  Carrying more obvious capacity for 
international conflict, SOX codifies US norms concerning audit committees, imposing specific 
mandates and independence requirements differing from those of other vital countries; and 
requires CFO/CEO certifications seen by other vital countries as alien on three levels: individual 
responsibility on the officers versus collective responsibility on the board or management; 
internal controls geared toward different financial reporting processes; and attestation to the 
globally Protean concept of a “fair presentation.” 
 
 Consider more specifically SOX’s provisions requiring annual officer financial 
certifications.40 A key issue concerns the requirement to certify that the financial statements 
“fairly present” a registrant’s condition and results.  This concept, introduced to Europe by the 
UK in the Fourth Directive, is a source of endless controversy in Europe, and in Japan.  Though 
the standard has been required of non-US SEC registrants for years, including it in the officer 
certificates raised concerns about whether liability standards had changed.  While this was also 
an uncertainty in the US, it carries potentially greater risks for non-US registrants outside the 
Anglo-American traditions. 
 
 The meaning of “fairly presents” (or in the UK “true and fair” and France the image 
fidele) varies throughout the world.41  If the accounts must fairly present (or be true and fair) 
strictly according to US norms, it is virtually impossible at present for a non-US issuer to meet 
the standard fully.   The meanings are rooted in different traditions, with all the spokes of 
corporate life sustaining the differences.  That can remain the case even after reconciliation with 
US GAAP.  Until SOX, non-US SEC registrants exhibited a level of comfort with the overlap 
between US meanings of true and fair with local meanings.  If the stakes are raised too much, the 
risk of error in estimating the overlap becomes too great.42 
 
 A related general issue arising under the certification requirements—as well as much of 
the overall philosophy of SOX—concerns internal controls and processes necessary to enable 
those certifications and disclosure.  These vary under local rules and practices throughout the 
world.  A mandate to certify the design and failsafe of such systems leaves ambiguity concerning 
exactly what controls are required.   Thus failure to conform to SOX’s implicit or explicit 
requirements increases risks to non-US issuers. 
 
 The third broad difficulty with the officer certification is the imposition of responsibility 
on individuals versus collectives.  Boards have this responsibility elsewhere, not particular 
people.  On the other hand, contemporary German reforms expressly shift responsibility from 
groups within the corporation to individual actors.  A movement towards individual 
responsibility within corporations may be detected in Japan as well.  The process is new, 
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however (and bears a mark of American individualism), making compliance with individual 
officer certifications a slightly more risky undertaking for non-US issuers. 
 
III. SOX’s Global Reception 
 
 These sorts of differences formed the basis for global criticism of SOX.  Reactions varied 
among countries.  Some rightly criticized particular SOX provisions, and the SEC in most cases 
subsequently offered accommodations. Others criticized SOX’s reach into the internal affairs of 
non-US corporations on principle.  Most criticism suggested deeper concerns: that the norms 
SOX carries conflict with ultimate concepts of corporate purpose and are thus threatening.  
While these concerns are legitimate, they may unintentionally be exaggerated.  At the same time, 
the US position was insensitive to these legitimate concerns.  When it comes to corporate law 
and practice amid globalization, the US and its global neighbors all need lessons in comity.  
 
A.  Public Reactions 
 
 Facing SOX’s broad reach, a group of 24 German corporations promptly and publicly 
petitioned the SEC for an exemption.  They argued that the German system prevents the sort of 
accounting and other fraud perpetrated at US companies such as Enron and WorldCom that 
SOX’s provisions expressly address.  First, CEOs do not dominate firms the way they dominate 
US firms.  Second, two boards govern, a supervisory board composed mainly of non-
management directors and spearheading the duty to conduct annual audits, and a management 
board with the operational officers.  Third, the supervisory board’s members include, by 
statutory mandate, employee representatives.   
 
 These seals in Germany’s corporate governance structures raise points of practical 
conflict with SOX.  As to governance, SOX requires all members of audit committees to be 
independent.  But the German model’s employee-populated supervisory board with audit 
responsibility conflicts with SOX’s outlawing non-independent audit committee members.  The 
conflicts are subtle and of two sorts, one legal and one cultural.  The legal conflict arises at the 
level of the supervisory board, nominally the audit committee.  SOX’s audit committee 
independence rules would bar employees from serving.  The cultural conflict arises because 
many German corporations in practice moved audit committee powers to the management board 
to avoid employee involvement, but management board members would likewise not qualify as 
independent under SOX.  After much lobbying, the SEC offered accommodations to this 
corporate governance model under SOX.43 
 
 The most potentially acute conflict SOX poses for Germany does not concern these nuts 
and bolts of governance and auditing or even disclosure, but the certification requirements 
drilling down to “fairly presents.” This challenges the methodology and goals of German 
accounting and, ultimately, corporate purpose.   In that sense, the deeper conflicts antedate SOX 
and are unaffected by it.   What differs, of course, is that the US is throwing its weight behind the 
requirement in a heightened manner, shining a spotlight on an issue German corporations have 
dealt with in lower key ways such as arguing that a true and fair view is produced by adhering to 
German bookkeeping in reporting the numbers and using footnote disclosure to explain how 
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different the figures would be but for the effects of peculiar German accounting rules such as 
those concerning taxes and reserves.44 
 
While the semiotic challenge and international pressure is independent of SOX, the 
challenge and pressure rise.  And they address head-on the measurement of corporate 
performance which is at bottom a question of corporate purpose—a true and fair view indicates a 
shareholder primacy norm whereas German bookkeeping indicates a survivalist orientation.  
Accordingly, while SOX’s detailed rules bear surface conflicts with German law, those conflicts 
cannot explain vociferous German objections.45  The objections run to deeper matters of 
corporate conception.  And that battle both antedates SOX and continues in its wake.   
  
 If the German corporate voice was loudest in objecting on the merits due to substantive 
legal conflicts and deeper threats to ultimate corporate conceptions, the French voice was loudest 
in objecting in principle despite few or no conflicts but perhaps deeper distaste.46  Few SOX 
provisions conflict with French corporate regulation or practice.  On the contrary, its overriding 
philosophy of audit and control, founded on principles of independence, has long been embedded 
in French corporate regulation and practice.47 
 
 French government leaders urged their own set of reforms, inspired by SOX or at least 
along similar lines.48  The parallel reform effort was in France led by Daniel Bouton, chairman of 
Sociéeté Générale.49 French business leaders indicated that while the US needed SOX-type 
reforms, the French either do not really need them or could incorporate its provisions with ease.50  
And they are correct.  The two systems bear critical similarities that create co-extensive pressure 
points, including centrally the strong-manager/weak-board syndrome.51  Even the officer 
certification provisions relating to fair presentations have been embraced by French 
multinationals in a far fuller way than compared to German multinationals. 
 
 What critics in France mostly emphasized was SOX’s political power dimension: 
“European countries should find a stronger collective voice in setting corporate governance 
standards, in order to carry more weight in discussions with US standards bodies.”52  The French 
response to SOX does not concern SOX’s detailed content, as much as the sense that its entire 
apparatus is geared toward profit-maximizing market oriented corporations that stand in tension 
with French industrial policy traditions and emerging norms in Europe—and the next subsection 
suggests similar truths concerning other public reactions to SOX.   
 
 British government leaders urged the US to back down, after SOX passed, fanning out 
with their counterparts to lobby for exemptions.53 Trade Secretary Patricia Hewitt criticized SOX 
as addressed to US problems and Congress for failing to think through its extra-territorial effects 
and impact on non-US firms.  She also argued that the UK regulatory framework is stricter and 
better than the US version, even after SOX.  British business leaders echoed such sentiments, 
seeing SOX as a yawn, an extra hassle, something to live with, and that British industry has no 
problem certifying its accounts or doing the other things SOX mandates.54 
 
·  The British criticism of SOX was mainly that the US was playing an awkward game of 
catch up with UK norms.  The criticism reaffirms a strong sense in which the UK/US model is an 
overlapping model.  Any differences of emphasis or scope are mainly differences in which the 
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US lags behind the UK.  There is substantial harmony, and UK SEC registrants face few burdens 
in meeting SOX’s demands.  But they are superfluous.55 
·  
  The Japanese response to SOX is difficult to gauge.  Some prominent Japanese 
corporations publicly criticized SOX,56 at least one aborted a planned NYSE listing,57 and others 
nodded their contentment.58  As in other countries, leading business groups spelled out the 
concerns in lobbying efforts before the SEC, but precise reasons are more difficult to enumerate 
compared to doing so for the UK, Germany or France. 
 
·  A cultural chasm separates Japanese and US corporate conceptions, radiating throughout 
each spoke of those conceptions.  Even seemingly simple provisions of SOX do not map well 
onto the Japanese corporate governance template.  For example, SOX repeatedly uses the 
concept of officers, a designation ill-suited to Japanese corporate governance, where those who 
would be considered officers in the US are in fact board members operating through the 
elaborate hierarchy of committees.  Post-SOX, the SEC offered accommodations that address 
certain of these differences.59 
·  
 The European Union’s reception of SOX included a blistering list of seven points of 
objection and produced lobbying effort seeking exemptions.60  Even so, the criticism from 
Brussels appeared less intense than that emanating from local European capitals, especially Paris 
and Frankfurt.61   Three possible explanations appear.   
 
 First, the European Union’s willingness to accept some of SOX’s rules may be a simple 
recognition of the governance sense of many of them.62  Second, SOX’s threat is less acute to 
Brussels at the moment than to Paris and Frankfurt, simply because there are French and German 
SEC registrants but as yet no European corporations (“SEs”) in existence let alone listed in the 
US.  The third possibility contains both a speculation and a normative point. 
 
 Whether European Union leaders are conscious of it or not, SOX’s mandates reflecting 
rules oriented toward advanced capital markets can be helpful to Europe as she steers her capital 
markets in that direction.  The external imposition of internal uniformity can be a force the 
various European countries working with one another have failed and never may through those 
means be able to achieve.  It creates an opportunity to generate long-sought harmony for a 
centralized or at least integrated European stock market, putting together disparate powerhouses 
in London, Paris, Frankfurt, Zurich, Milan and other capital cities.  On the downside, of course, 
those standards are US products rather than products of international or European development. 
 
 There is no doubt that Europe is eager to integrate and deepen its public capital markets, 
however.63 The EU steers away from imposing uniform corporate regulations on member 
states.64  Doing so through Directives is a cumbersome process.  But some degree of uniformity 
will ultimately be necessary and more of it may be desirable for capital formation, capital cost 
reductions, and greater competitive power Union-wide.65  To the extent this must be done by 
Directive, prospects are not high; to the extent it can be done through securities market 
regulation, they are much higher.66  To the extent SOX offers a mechanism to aid the process—
directly or through rallying European member states to oppose it in favor of pan-European 
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solutions—Europe may benefit, giving it a source of thrust in the endless give and take that 
characterizes European corporate harmonization efforts.67 
 
 Moreover, national legislatures in Europe need not fear that development of European 
capital market regulation will be used to impose discipline on member states, a feature of US 
capital markets that keeps Delaware and other competitors for state charters in check in their race 
to the bottom or top in chartering corporations and regulating their affairs.68  The risk of such a 
race in the US is a product of the US conflict of laws principle called the internal affairs doctrine.  
Corporations can locate and operate anywhere in the US and be governed by the corporate laws 
of another state entirely.  Capital market discipline—through investor action and federal 
regulatory supervision—keeps states in check. 
 
 Europe takes a different view, holding that the law of the corporation’s main place of 
operations or business governs (the siege social rule).69  There should be no race to the bottom 
through simple reincorporation to member states offering favorable charters.  There is no need to 
develop Union-wide regulation to impose constraints on such a race.  That is a selling point for 
harmonization efforts through capital markets.  The remaining risk of a race to the bottom in 
Europe is continued fragmentation of her capital markets.  That risk emboldens the movement 
towards linking European bourses, another force given potential power by the controversy over 
SOX.   
 
B.  Reinterpreting the Public Reactions  
 
 The discussion of France’s public reaction to SOX suggested more is at stake than meets 
the eye.  It is possible to understand the German and French reception of SOX at face value, as 
expressions of concern for comity, for the US pursuing global harmonization of prevalent 
differences in business practices unilaterally.  It is possible to understand the warmer UK 
reception in terms of SOX’s non-radical character given fundamental US-UK system 
comparability.  Standard harmonization perspectives do not readily explain the nuanced EU and 
Japanese responses (and for that matter SOX’s strong endorsement from such places as Brazil, 
Russia and Thailand).70 
 
 Explaining the variable receptions is enriched, however, by emphasizing SOX’s potential 
effect on national corporate conceptions.  With few exceptions, all SOX provisions bear 
conceptions of the corporation that are distinctly Anglo-American.  Whatever uproar they 
produced in the US and the UK (or in countries with kindred systems such as Canada and Israel), 
at least corporate citizens in those countries can recognize their own culture in SOX’s approach 
to the regulatory landscape. 
 
 For countries outside the Anglo-American cultural heritage, SOX is distinctly foreign.  
This is far more than a simple matter of conflict of laws, however.  True, in certain significant 
cases, such as for German corporations under SOX’s audit committee rules, SOX’s provisions 
directly conflict with a corporation’s home country law, making it nearly impossible to comply 
with both.  The German ruckus in response to SOX could be understood in these terms.  But 
something more seems at stake. 
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 Even in cases where substantial regulatory harmony between SOX and home country 
rules appear, as in France, an unmistakable cultural emblem accompanies SOX that translates 
poorly.  A superficial explanation of simple anti-imperialism doesn’t capture the depths of the 
French rebuke of SOX.  Nor would it explain why the Japanese assessment of SOX was far less 
concerned with its imperialist overtones.  On the contrary, Japanese law was amended during the 
same era SOX was adopted to expressly permit home corporations to adopt either Japanese or 
US-style governance systems.   
 
 A fuller explanation of the variegated global reactions to SOX emerges from addressing 
how it bears on the special missions designated for home corporations. US and UK companies 
share the goal of maximizing shareholder profits, a goal to which SOX’s provisions are directed.  
An integral part of that goal in the UK, more so than in the US, is to promote British capital 
markets, another potentially powerful by-product of having companies follow US-style corporate 
regulation epitomized by SOX.  In Japan, the penultimate corporate goal is expanding power, 
measured by factors such as corporate size and market share.  Adoption or use of SOX-style   
provisions with the deeper characteristics of the US model may be seen as facilitating that goal, 
directly or in comparison with other nations.   
 
 The penultimate goal of German corporations is survival, a feat threatened by imposition 
of non-German corporate norms, a direct challenge to survival of corporate Germany.  In France, 
corporate orientation supports sovereignty enhancement, of boosting the French state and its 
constituent parts, corporate and personal.  Externally imposed mandates threaten that purpose, a 
deeper affront compared to territorial-regulatory integrity concerning the detailed matters SOX 
addresses.  The EU’s emergent community conception of the corporation seems surprisingly like 
that in Japan, designating competitive power as the corporate mission, a component of the bloc’s 
quest for economic might.71 
 
 SOX’s thrust is on audit and control, tools bearing resemblance in description, form, and 
structure in all vital countries.  But since audit and control address, test, and verify substantially 
different underlying accounting data driven by finance and governance peculiarities, the audit 
signifies different pressure points.  It could be that changes in audit and control drive changes in 
the other elements such as corporate purpose and governance and this is what SOX’s non-US 
foes fear.  The harmonization and convergence efforts to date suggest, however, that even 
substantial changes in audit and control can be rendered sufficiently capacious to leave these 
other elements undisturbed.  Such is the case with the true and fair view requirement, for 
example. 
 
Changes at the hub are the only changes that matter, in this view.  But this is far from 
obvious, so changes in the spokes—especially of auditing and control—that produce potential 
impacts on penultimate goals will drive global discourse in responding to externally-driven 
standards and rules.   SOX contains a plethora of these, mostly codifications of US practices, and 
most of which are the sorts of tools used in all vital and many other countries though with 
different emphasis and to different ends. 
 
 As a result of these potent forces, national reactions are likely to be geared to SOX’s 
influence on corporate purpose rather than to SOX’s detailed provisions that may conflict with 
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local standards.  This remains true even if the likelihood is slight that those detailed provisions 
can dent such ultimate purposes.  The history of harmonization efforts amid globalization 
suggests this is the case.  The most harmonized area is accounting, and it faces obstacles at every 
turn.  The prospects for auditing and control harmony forged via SOX are not much greater.   
 
IV. Imprecision in the “No-Scandal-Here” Criticism 
  
 A chorus of global complaints against SOX held that its reforms were necessary to fix a 
leaky US system beset by scandal but that these were uniquely US problems.72  A test of the 
premises of this argument reinforces the thesis that global reactions to SOX were louder than 
content warranted, but still reasonable given possible threats to conceptions of ultimate corporate 
purpose. 
 
 The “no-scandal-here” criticism is too blunt.  Problems of corporate malfeasance are 
everywhere, though they concern different things.  Controls, processes and rules exist 
everywhere and can be broken everywhere.  Some of these rules look the same, but they are 
trying to control different forms of deviance.  To this extent, the “no-scandal-here” criticism 
misses the mark but carries the hidden truth that nipping at recurring scandals calls for tailored 
tools.  This makes SOX even more objectionable, not because scandals are absent elsewhere but 
because of scandals’ local flavor. 
 
The US goal of profit-making for shareholders entails rules to control agency costs of 
siphoning off corporate assets in derogation of their claims (or those of creditors in the case of 
insolvency where corporate mission shifts).73  The German goal of assuring survival means 
taking all prudent steps to protect the entity as a whole, broadly conceived.  This entails rules to 
control for policies or practices that push towards bankruptcy (or even unwanted takeover, as the 
recent German response to the rejected 13th Directive indicates).74   France bears the same 
distinction, reflected in its special accounting laws governing troubled companies.  In France and 
Japan relationships with the state play a more intimate role in business, producing greater 
possibilities for deviations from norms governing such relationships.   
 
The global history of corporate chicanery shows that no country or system is free of 
scandals.75  Start with Germany.  Germany had its share of accounting scandals dovetailing with 
those precipitating SOX.  The upshot there was the expansion of the powers of its financial 
sector regulator, the BAFin, with new powers of an accounting police functionally equivalent to 
various accounting and enforcement arms of the SEC.76   On the agenda were proposals to hold 
managers directly liable, an innovation in Germany, where liability for covering up and 
misleading reports previously lay with the company as a whole.77 
 
Germany’s version of the US’s Enron-era frauds was led by the regional bank 
Bankgesellschaft Berlin, which appears to have falsified its accounts for years.78  The scandal 
began to emerge, and regulators to crack down, before Enron erupted in the US.  There were 
many runners-up.79   Germany’s high-tech market forged during the global bubble of the late 
1990s shut down as of 2003 after disclosure of a series of accounting and governance duplicity.80    
For example, ComRoad purported to develop traffic-navigation technology for the automotive 
industry.  The start-up instead manufactured sales, purporting to comply with German 
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bookkeeping, sporting a market cap of US$1 billion, eventually imploding, and landing its 
founder a seven-year prison term.81 
 
 The cause celbre in France of the 1990s was the major corporate scandal at Credit 
Lyonnais.   CEO Jean-Yves Haberer overextended the state-owned bank’s risk portfolio, 
investing in ill-fated projects such as East London’s Canary Wharf development and cash-
starved MGM movie studio.  Weak controls produced losses at the bank of some $2 billion in 
1994 rising to $17 billion in 1997.  The French Ministry of Finance put the bank in functional 
receivership.  Judicial investigations ensued, examining whether French government officials 
concealed the bank’s problems when it published its financial reports.  Top executives faced 
criminal charges for their role in the debacle.82 
 
 During the era provoking SOX, France suffered from a corporate crisis known there as 
France’s Enron: the case of Vivendi Universal SA.  CEO Jean-Marie Messier transformed a 
modest water utility company into a multinational media empire rivaling AOL-Time Warner and 
News Corporation, only to bring the company to the brink of bankruptcy due to accounting 
aggression, disclosure deception, and supine supervision.  Mirroring US governance crises of the 
era, Messier hid the company’s financial turmoil from Vivendi’s board and shareholders for 
many months.  When discovered, it was too late to extricate Vivendi from the disaster. 
 
 Europe as a political entity faced analogous weaknesses.  In formulating the EU budget, 
accounting controls turned out to be unreliable.83  In Summer 2002, as corporate scandals 
reached crescendo in the US, reports leaked a paper by the EU’s court of auditors saying the 
EU’s €98 billion budget is “insecure and unreliable.”84  The reports vindicated the position taken 
earlier by the EU’s former chief accountant, who was ousted for her criticism and her refusal to 
sign the EU’s 2001 accounts.85 The reports and earlier criticism by the EU’s court of auditors 
declared that “no account has been taken of generally accepted accounting standards, mainly 
double-entry book-keeping” and final data “may be inconsistent, so that a single line of 
expenditure can have two different values.”86  Also “Controls in the system were inadequate” so 
that it was impossible to “present reliable accounting data on the amounts advanced to third 
parties.”87 
 
 Looking back a few decades in Japan, consider the global scandals involving US 
companies bribing foreign officials during the 1960s and 1970s.  In Japan, this became known as 
the Lockheed scandal and led directly to the overthrow of its government.  The resulting reforms 
in the US were the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act;88 in Japan, the Lockheed scandal resulted in 
reforms to make directors more accountable to the whole board and strengthening the whole 
board’s supervisory authority.89  The goal was to transform Japanese boards from hollow shells 
controlled by powerful presidents.90  These scandals were independent of the US influence, as 
corporate Japan suffered accounting scandals among several large public corporations in late 
1964 and early 1965, resulting in bankruptcies and provoking regulatory responses from the 
Tokyo and Osaka stock exchanges and from the Minister of Finance.91 
 
 More recently, Japanese business took a black eye in the scandals involving Snow Brand 
Milk.  The food maker’s milk products caused mass food poisoning in 2000 revealing poor 
internal controls and lax hygiene standards.  A year later fraud was discovered at its meat 
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subsidiary, with 30 tons of imported beef products deliberately mislabeled in order to win 
government subsidies paid on domestic beef following Japanese scares that imported beef carried 
“mad cow” disease.  In November 2002, five employees were sentenced to jail by a Japanese 
court for their role in the scam.92 
 
 Other major countries witnessed corporate scandals during the same period, ranging from 
Belgium93 and Switzerland94 to China.95  According to the OECD, the Asian financial crisis of 
1998 was caused in part by weaknesses in corporate governance at some Asian companies.96 
 
While the no-scandal-here argument is thus false, this does not necessarily mean that the 
proper fixes to any given country’s or bloc’s weaknesses are those contained in SOX.  On the 
contrary, problems arise in different ways and due to different reasons.  Different solutions may 
therefore be indicated.    But this insight renders the objection more significant as a matter of US 
policy, not less.  The frequency of the “no-scandal-here” argument shows foreign upset beyond 
SOX’s content, underscoring the need for greater sensitivity and diplomacy in formulating US 
corporate regulations affecting corporations around the world.   
 
V.   From Convergence to Comity 
 
 A common theme of all comparative law is the prospect of pressure toward convergence.  
Debate centers on the role law plays in culture.  At polar extremes one can see law as a driver of 
culture and legal reform conducting social change; at the other end law is but a factor in culture, 
an expression of culture, the surface of culture, so that legal change may influence culture but 
cannot control it.97 
 
A.  The State of Convergence as a State of Mind 
 
 In comparative corporate law, the convergence thesis is tested in terms of empirical 
observations about both legal change and consequent or concomitant social change.  In this line 
of study, custom specifies that the US/UK model exhibits an outward orientation from the 
corporation, with a focus on shareholder value and financial returns, while Germany, France and 
Japan are more insider-oriented with a collectivist and communitarian bent. 
 
 Substantial evidence can be marshaled to support a convergence thesis among these 
stances.  The issue then is convergence towards what, one of these models, or a hybrid.  
Evidence supporting convergence on lines of a US-UK model would include inclinations toward 
more contract- and market-based methods.98  Seen this way, the evidence is strong.  
 
 In Germany: unions and workers have lost clout; regulations are disappearing; banks are 
divesting equity positions and diversifying loan positions; enhanced standards for financial 
disclosure are adopted; new supervisory authority for securities markets is established; 
companies increasingly list shares abroad, in Anglo-American systems.99  In France: 
shareholders are demanding and getting more rights; regulations are limiting multiple 
directorships; hostile takeovers have appeared.100  In Japan: keiretsu firms have begun to sell 
some cross-shareholdings; lifetime employment is facing debate and decline; and there has been 
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a rise in Japanese corporations taking US or UK listings (now amounting to 34% of Tokyo’s 100 
largest market cap companies listed on a UK/US market).101 
 
 This view is intended to counter arguments that corporate governance systems are 
products of various historical, political and economic forces.102  Those forces mean systems are 
not just marching towards a competitive convergence in equilibrium.  They are path dependent, 
implying one cannot declare a winner.  The contractairan view sees clear evidence that the 
US/UK model is the best and the one all others are heading toward. 
 
 But is this so clear?  The evidence marshaled can all be admitted and credited.  None of it 
changes the hub.  The evidence suggests some movement to contractarian models as a spoke.  
Contract is a capacious instrument.  It can be used to achieve a variety of penultimate goals, from 
shareholder-centric profit generation, to corporate survival, to sovereign-enhancement, to power 
and expansion.  The capacity of contract is co-extensive with the capacity of the mechanical 
tools Europe has used to promote the true-and-fair view and to expand intra-continental auditing 
practices.  The same is true of SOX’s rules relating to governance and auditing.  All can be used 
as administrative mechanisms to promote corporate accountability, while to what ends 
accountability must be faithful vary sharply. 
 
 A stronger version of the US-UK convergence story remains possible, inspired by a strict 
brand of law and economics devoted to markets exclusively as the least dangerous means of 
supervising the production and organization of economic activity.  In this story for comparative 
corporate law, emphasis is on the universal and abstract rather than the unique and particular.  
Conceptions of the good are ultimate and all peoples will eventually see it the same way.  
Getting there is a haphazard and rough road toward a smoother paved convergence.  For legal 
comparativists, the chief engine driving passengers on this track is law.  Legal change—toward 
the looser, market-based and profit-oriented light at the end of the road—paves the way. 
 
 Signposts on this road are harder to see.  Immediate contrary evidence is precisely the 
reaction globally against embracing SOX, with its gears trained on profit maximizing 
corporations, managed, measured and audited using that baseline.  Even in Europe, as already 
noted, longstanding convergence efforts show as much resistance as motion—the EU’s 
philosophy moved from alacrity for unification to settling for harmonization at the level of 
general abstract principles filled in with vastly different underlying particularity.103 
 
 Developments suggest caution about the other extreme just as well.  Divergence theorists 
maintain excessively that resistance is immutable.  But change is likewise evident.  Some 
convergence is brewing. Strong evidence includes IASC’s articulation of such powerful and 
potentially transcendent accounting concepts as cash flow statements and segment reporting.104 
The concept of cultural essentialism is as out of whack with observation and common sense as 
the devotees of the road to Nirvana.   It is a cliché to note that it means little to observe that 
natives speak French in France, German in Germany and English in England.  It is useful to note 
that they virtually all speak in English, however.  Dynamism prevails. 
 
 The difference between economic convergites and cultural divergites is the latter allows 
for too little dynamism and the former for too much of one kind of dynamism.  The evidence 
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suggests that the reality lies in between.  Legal dynamism is iterative.105  Just how the iteration 
operates will remain as hidden as the issue of the causation of hub-and-spoke characteristics of 
existing models.  One clear consequence is some subordination of mere conflict of law matters.  
Just as the key problems with SOX vis-à-vis non-US issuers and auditors is not chiefly about 
conflict of laws, the iterative operation of global comparative corporate governance will rest on 
deeper philosophical differences over the purposes of the corporation than superficial conflicts in 
laws (or similarities for that matter).  
 
 Distinctions between domestic and foreign law become less important than questions 
about domestic and foreign practice.106  Evidence of these iterative elements can be identified.  
The evidence marshaled in support of expanding use of contract methods in civil law countries is 
matched by some evidence of increasing resort to fiduciary obligation and sensitivity to 
constituents other than shareholders in the US/UK model.107  But it remains the case that what 
matters are how those moves play out in operation, how US/UK directors embrace heightened 
standards of obligation to attend first to interests other than their own, such as shareholders, and 
second, to interests of constituencies other than themselves and shareholders.108 
 
 Corporations are creatures not only of law but of culture.  Global corporate governance, 
influenced or not by SOX, will remain distinctive, comparative, and characterized by different 
hubs, even as the spokes may on the surface converge.   Even those spokes are unlikely to exhibit 
uniform descriptions.  Law seems a less powerful force in that regard than markets.  The finance 
spoke is the one most likely to undergo change; of the spokes, it has undergone greatest change.  
Examples among the vital countries include increasing cross-listings, German bank 
diversification, and French industrial privatization.  Examples among countries in the global 
periphery are precisely the enormous increase in the number and size of foreign SEC registrants 
during the 1990s.109   
 
 The contending scholarly stories of convergence and path dependence are thus both 
partly true.  Convergence pressure exists and markets increasingly play a critical role.  But 
divergence persists, with other tools remaining vital.  The road to markets may be the only road 
to take.  But it is full of potholes.  The US leads the world down that road; the divergence-
convergence debate moves to the roadside.  What matters more is how that leadership is 
exercised.  The mechanisms of US corporate regulation determine the rules of the game and the 
shape of convergence and its success.110  This makes the US regulation of corporations a matter 
of international relations as a tool to influence the sustained spread of liberalism throughout the 
world. 
 
B.  The Road to Comity 
 
 The convergence case is strongest in its normative sense.  Free market capitalism is the 
most effective and only demonstrated method of sustaining growth and improving living 
standards. The American model requires no apology and US national interests must be staked 
and defended.  The risk is that uncontained, its collateral effects can produce a backlash that will 
undermine its enormous promise. Demanding compliance with it by other states or companies 
domiciled in those states is neither necessary nor fruitful to meet these objectives. This is the 
lesson from the 19th century’s laissez-faire extremism that gave rise to Marxism.111   The move to 
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global markets as a matter of economics must be matched by local politics that smooth the 
process.  That smoothness must begin with political comity when the internal regulation is 
imposed by another country. 
 
 With legislative moves such as SOX, this meant what the SEC did but too late: offering 
exemptions to SEC registrants already possessing requisite safeguards modeled locally.  The big 
mistake of SOX was not to attend to those matters as part of the legislative process.112  It was a 
case of domestic political pressures blinding lawmakers to important matters of international 
relations.  It was a wasted opportunity to exhibit comity in the exercise of US power on a matter 
that would cost the US little.113 
 
 Nothing in law requires any US consultation with counterparts abroad when passing 
legislation such as SOX.  Nor is there any particular reason to consult issuers and auditors in 
foreign states, just as there is no obligation to conduct such outreach applies to domestic 
corporations.    
 
 As to members of Congress, moreover, ordinarily lobbyists would come to them to opine 
and influence, not the other way around.   Lobbyists on behalf of foreign interests did seek to 
influence members of Congress concerning SOX, ranging from Commissioners of the European 
Union to a group of CEOs of German SEC registrants.  The Committee hearings, however, 
eschewed this international relations dimension of the legislation.114 
 
 Within the executive branch, moreover, when legislation poses extraterritorial 
consequences and is strongly influenced by a US regulatory body, that body would ordinarily be 
expected to venture some outreach to its affected regulatory counterparts.  In the case of SOX, 
this would mean the SEC reaching out to the London Stock Exchange, the UK’s Financial 
Services Authority, the Federation of European Securities Exchanges, European ministers, 
international accounting bodies, or the 100-nation International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO).115 
 
 A few special features of SOX’s context rendered the outreach particularly important.  
First, the speed with which SOX was brought; second, the impaired ability of non-U S regulatory 
agencies to seek or obtain a formal hearing through the legislative process; and third the repeated 
characterizations made by SOX’s sponsors and by commentators that SOX carried “sweeping” 
and “far-reaching” effects.  While these statements were exaggerated as far as US registrants are 
concerned, they are more accurate as applied to non-US issuers. 
 
 On the other hand, despite globalization, US securities regulation’s traditional dedication 
to investor protection must not be undermined.  Congress and the SEC must conduct vigilant 
oversight of US capital markets and modify the regulatory environment in accordance with 
institutional judgments concerning investor protection goals.  After all, 90% of SEC registrants 
are US entities, for which only that supervisory framework is relevant in the US.  Whatever 
one’s views on the prudence or scope of SOX, Congress and the SEC properly exercised their 




 Injecting an international relations viewpoint into the process would not require much, 
however.  It would call for Congressional committee hearings to include examination of the 
global effects of US corporate legislation.  In the case of SOX, beyond this it need not change 
anything Congress or the SEC did with respect to those registrants.  To recognize this dimension 
would have meant simply doing before SOX became effective for non-US SEC registrants 
exactly what the SEC belatedly did after enactment.  It took several quarters to do so, but the 
SEC eventually gave hearings to foreign representatives and exemptions from various 
requirements of SOX for non-US issuers for whom those elements were unsuitable from the 
issuer’s viewpoint and unnecessary to achieve the US goal of investor protection. 
 
 These steps should be taken beforehand.  This can be accomplished with no other change 
in the legislative process (apart from committee examination of the collateral effects).  In the 
case of SOX, exactly the same process would have been followed, except an additional provision 
in the Act would have rendered it ineffective as to non-US SEC registrants.  The provision could 
stay effectiveness indefinitely or suspend it until either the SEC elects to declare it effective or 
until Congress does so following reports from the SEC.117 
 
 The determination to stay or impose effectiveness would depend on a finding that all or 
some non-US registrants undergo adequate comparable regulatory supervision in their home 
country so that US investor protection goals are deemed satisfied by compliance.118  This 
determination could be made on a country-by-country basis for most companies (“favored 
nations”) or for particular companies operating in countries that otherwise lack requisite controls 
but which voluntarily comply with specified international standards (“world class 
companies”).119  The “favored nation” approach would have the virtue of encouraging local 
corporations concerned with dual regulation in the US and at home to promote home 
requirements that meet requisite US standards.  The key international relations benefit of such a 
measure is the result creates a measure of voluntary compliance compared to that generated by 
unilateral fiat such as SOX. 
 
 The favored nation approach would also neutralize any risks of US corporations pursuing 
forum shopping as a way to benefit from temporary or permanent stays of regulatory 
effectiveness.  The minor risk would remain that US corporations could still shop for 
jurisdictions that while qualifying as recognized foreign jurisdictions remain more attractive for 
idiosyncratic reasons.  The solution to prevent this is simply to develop the federal equivalent of 
the pseudo-foreign corporation rules of some states (such as California or New York) or the 
siege social rule of Europe.  Nominal incorporation in a foreign state would be ignored for 
corporations that are functionally US corporations.  Measuring this functionality would be done 
by similar tests, including headquarters location, employee or shareholder or base, or history (for 
example any company having been created in a US jurisdiction or existing as one during the 





 SOX shook the corporate world, far beyond US borders.  It did so at a time when global 
liberalism has strong chances for ascendancy but also faces great risks of backlash that thwarts 
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its spread.  The risks are greatest in the corners of the world facing the greatest challenges—
starting with Africa, then Asia, then Latin America.  As to the US’s best friends—starting with 
the UK but extending across Europe—SOX comes amid formulations of the most profound 
expression of European identity in corporate law, the formation of the SE.   
 
 The identity of SE companies is yet undefined by their governance, finance, accounting, 
and auditing attributes.  They will be endowed with US versions, European versions, or the 
versions of particular European states, or perhaps pan-Atlantic versions.   The clearest sense in 
which an Atlantic US-European partnership operates in corporate affairs is a pan-Atlantic 
complexion. Bullying European companies with a US complexion overlooks this important 
opportunity for shaping this partnership. 
 
 On the other hand it is not too late.  The legislation is not as sweeping as the rhetoric 
accompanying it advertised.   True, for non-US issuers, SOX imposes alien forms.  In that sense 
SOX fails as it reflects the worst of prevalent US international relations formulation, in which the 
US Congress imposes itself unnecessarily on the US’s closest allies.120  The world’s unipolar 
power owes its friends respect, particularly friends whose own history is marked by global 
preeminence.  As for the global upset SOX caused, leaders of other countries should 
appreciate—as many clearly do, in each of the vital countries and elsewhere—the US domestic 
pressures and need to respond to weaknesses in corporate governance and accounting systems in 
the US.  It is a two-way street.   
 
 US corporate scandals will recur.  SOX will not stop that.  When they do, Congress and 
the SEC ought to embrace a recognized institutional structure in which reform laws are 
automatically inapplicable to non-US issuers until and unless the SEC renders them applicable.   
Non-US issuers would be assured of getting a fair and up-front shake in the regulatory process.  
The US instantly benefits from the expression of comity it extends.  Needed extensions of the 
regulations can be assessed in due course by the SEC. 
 
 The US may be the host of the party and can certainly invite who it wishes and lay down 
the etiquette.   But part of being a good host is recognizing the right guest list and treating guests 
with respect.  Taking these steps is at bottom a far more common-sense approach than the 
arrogant hue of SOX, and ultimately far simpler and inexpensive than the very complicated 
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